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The network economy which based on computer networks and communication 
technology has brought great change to the life style of human-being and the 
operation model of society. The most important feature of the network economy is 
network externality. For the firm in the network economy, product differentiation 
strategy is one of the important strategies to win the market competition. At the same 
time, achieving compatibility between products has a different significance for 
competitors at different market status. In this dissertation, we try to make good use 
of network economics, basic principle of game theory and the Hotelling Model, do 
some research in the compatibility decision-making of network product based on 
horizontal differentiation. 
First of all, we build a game model of two firms’ competition, focus on 
considering the strategies of compatibility between the incumbent and potential firm 
under the condition that horizontal product differentiation exists. When products are 
incompatible with each other, the existence of network externality enlarges the 
market competition. When the intensity of network externality is large enough, 
equilibrium results will be the same as the case of perfect competition, firms can not 
reap super profits by differential positioning. When products are compatible with 
each other, the existence of network externality protects the status of incumbent firm. 
The product price of the incumbent firm is higher than the price of entry firm and the 
incumbent will gain higher profits. And the entry firm should make low-price 
strategy to survive in the market. 
Secondly, we build a game model of three firms’ competition, focus on 
considering the strategies of compatibility between the two incumbent firms under 
the condition that product horizontal differentiation and the threat of potential firm 
all exist. Research shows that when the market entry of potential firm does not 
happen, the best strategy for both of the incumbent firms is fully compatibility. 
When the market entry of potential firm happened, then the best strategy for both of 













characteristic of network externality, the potential firm tends to enter the market 
where the incumbent firms take the strategy of products incompatibility. 
The innovation may mainly reflect in the following three points: 
Firstly, the transport unit cost is endogenlized as one and is introduced to the 
assumption of the expansion Hotelling model. This change solves the problem of 
best positioning decision-making for network products. It analyzes the product 
compatibility strategy in the competition, makes a supplementary to the original 
theory. 
Secondly, this dissertation premises the assumption deficiency of the existing 
research: consumers have consistent preference to the externality of different 
networks. The paper introduces consumer’s different evaluation to the network 
utility to the research. 
Thirdly, this dissertation considers the competition situation that the two 
incumbent firms face the entry threat of potential firm, analyzes the product 
compatibility strategy between the two incumbent firms and improves the existing 
theoretical results. 
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